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Policy recommendations for re-evaluating 
and reducing youth unemployment 
Zachary Kilhoffer, Miroslav Beblavý and Karolien Lenaerts 
 
Abstract 
Youth unemployment has ranked high on the agenda of European policymakers since the onset 
of the crisis. Ten years later, youth unemployment remains stubbornly high in a number of 
member states. This paper offers policy recommendations for rethinking and reducing youth 
unemployment in Europe. To this end, it filters and summarises the results of the STYLE 
research project on youth unemployment in Europe, and supplements these with additional 
literature. The paper explores three sets of questions: i) How to define and measure youth 
employment? ii) What are its causes and effects? and iii) What can be done about the 
phenomenon? The findings indicate that youth unemployment is poorly understood and the 
most common measurements are insufficient. Its causes are diverse, arising from both the 
inherent disadvantages suffered by younger people in the labour market as well as from 
structural changes occurring in the labour market. The effects of youth unemployment are 
detrimental and significant at both the societal and individual level. Based on our analysis, we 
put forward 13 broad policy recommendations to address youth unemployment in Europe. 
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Executive Summary 
This policy synthesis selectively summarises findings of the STYLE project, supplemented by 
additional literature on youth unemployment, to form policy recommendations to re-evaluate 
and reduce youth unemployment. It draws from over 60 STYLE working papers and other 
literature to discuss conceptual issues, causes, consequences and policy solutions for youth 
unemployment in Europe.  
What is the size and shape of youth unemployment? How do we better understand it? 
Youth unemployment is complicated and frequently misunderstood. The most common 
headline statistic, the youth unemployment rate, does little to promote an accurate 
understanding of the problem. To begin to address these issues, researchers in the project 
propose an updated definition for the term “youth” and a new primary measurement for 
“youth unemployment”. Specifically this entails expanding the age range of youth from 15-24 
to 15-29 and compiling data in separate ranges for ages 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29 to account for 
the different labour market issues affecting each group. In some cases a wider range is used to 
measure longer-term transitions, for example in leaving the family home, which includes young 
people up to 34 years old. In other cases, for example, early school leaving (ESL) is a primary 
consideration in the youngest age group, while being neither employed, in education, or 
training (NEET) is largely centred in the oldest age group. Researchers examine the use of the 
youth unemployment ratio over the youth unemployment rate as the primary indicator of 
youth unemployment, as well as greater use of other statistical measures of precariousness. 
One innovative example is youth labour market outsiderness (YLMO), which captures a wide 
range of undesirable and precarious labour market outcomes. 
What is responsible for high youth unemployment?  
The literature survey revealed diverse causes of high youth unemployment (in comparison to 
total unemployment). Certain reasons are rather inherent to the age group, such as the school 
to work (STW) transition. Few young people secure employment immediately upon leaving 
school or graduating, leading most young people to enter the labour market unemployed, at 
least for a spell. An additional consideration is the ‘employment trap’. Because employers 
prefer to hire those who already have experience, it creates a situation in which job seekers 
need experience to earn experience.  
Socioeconomics also influence young people’s ability to find employment. Demographic factors 
such as gender and ethnicity interact with youthfulness, creating intersecting disadvantages 
that make it more difficult for young people to overcome barriers to employment. At the 
macroeconomic scale, conditions including an overall poor labour market and the increasing 
use of ‘precarious’ job contracts have disproportionately affected youth. The evidence from 
the research conducted in the STYLE project identify the following factors as causes of high 
youth unemployment as follows:  factors that have always placed young people at a 
disadvantage in the labour market, combined with certain labour reforms implemented since 
the beginning of the 21st century, have made young people uniquely vulnerable to 
unemployment. These vulnerabilities were exacerbated by overall poor economic conditions 
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associated with the Great Recession, resulting in excessive and enduring high youth 
unemployment. 
Why does youth unemployment matter?  
Youth unemployment has high costs for both individuals and society. Eurofound calculated the 
“cost of not integrating NEETs” in Europe at over €150 billion, or 1.2% of GDP. Certain countries 
including Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia and Poland are paying more 
than 2% of their GDP in costs related to NEETs (Eurofound, 2012b). One report estimated the 
annual cost per young jobseeker in the UK to be between £5,400 and £16,000 (Prince’s Trust, 
2010). 
At the individual level, youth who experience bouts of unemployment earlier in life earn 
significantly less and bear emotional scars for many years. This is especially pronounced for 
lower-income youth, which has worrying implications for cyclical poverty and intergenerational 
transmission of disadvantage. Young people with strong familial support, for example, are 
better able to wait out periods of unemployment until a good opportunity presents itself. Young 
people who must financially support themselves need to accept any job, often those 
incommensurate with their education and goals, leading to job mismatch and reduced human 
capital development. Recurring bouts of unemployment and precarious employment are very 
common and associated with frequent housing and employment changes.  
How best to improve youth unemployment in Europe? 
From the analysis conducted in the project, the evidence from different authors within the 
STYLE project and unaffiliated authors leads to 13 policy areas for member states and European 
policymakers to address youth unemployment. These 13 foci are based on the authors’ analysis 
of the available literature. The recommendations seek to change our understanding of youth 
unemployment, encourage policy innovation, prevent youth unemployment before it occurs, 
reintroduce unemployed youth into education or the labour market and bring about structural 
changes. The proposals are briefly stated below, and are elaborated upon in Chapter 3. The 
accompanying citations refer to literature that helped inform the policy proposals. 
1. Always keep in mind the need for a supportive macroeconomic environment 
(Hadjivassiliou et al., 2015; forthcoming; Eichhorst and Wozny, 2016). 
2. Ensure high-quality education for all levels, particularly early childhood and primary 
school: focus on prevention, early identification and support for youth in vulnerable 
households (Berloffa et al., 2016, Medgyesi and Nagy, forthcoming). 
3. Increase opportunities for low and middle class children – and especially children from 
vulnerable households – to pursue higher education (Berloffa et al., 2016). 
4. Prevent ‘dualistic’ labour market structure with ‘standard’ and ‘precarious’ contracts 
(Russell et al., 2015; Smith and Villa, 2016, Eamets et al., 2015).  
5. Promote a more holistic and accurate understanding of youth unemployment (Leschke 
and Finn, 2016). 
6. Encourage youth employment policy innovation and experimentation, as well as 
knowledge-sharing mechanisms (Petmesidou and González-Menéndez, 2015; 2016). 
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7. Strengthen the role of the education system in school-to-work (STW) transitions 
(Eurofound 2012a, McGuinness et al., 2015b). 
8. Focus resources on certain active labour market policies (ALMPs) more relevant to youth 
(Gonzalez Carreras et al., 2015; Petmesidou and González-Menéndez, 2015; Dorsett 
and Luccino, 2013; Kalwij, 2004; Berlingieri et al., 2014). 
9. Expand the use of labour intermediaries to facilitate mobility, connecting job seekers to 
jobs (Hyggen et al., 2016; European Commission, 2010; Kureková and Ortlieb, 2016). 
10. Enhance integration and non-discriminatory treatment of migrants (Akgüç and Beblavý, 
2015; European Commission, 2017; ECVET, 2017; Hyggen et al., 2016; Mýtna Kureková 
and Ortlieb, 2016). 
11. Use hybrid support methods, combining financial and advisory resources, to empower 
youth entrepreneurs (Masso et al., 2015; Sheehan and McNamara, 2015; Sheehan et 
al., 2016; McNamara et al., 2016). 
12. Offer a lifeline to those not in education, employment, or training (NEETs) and early 
school leavers (ESLs): help them back into school or employment (Petmesidou et al., 
2016; Lőrinc et al., 2016). 
13. Recognise that every country is different and adjust the Youth Guarantee accordingly 
(European Court of Auditors, 2017; European Commission, n.d; Flek and Mysíková, 
2016). 
These recommendations are intended to be general and applicable to all member states. No 
one-size-fits-all strategy is advisable, so these 13 points are meant to offer flexible and practical 
strategies supported by STYLE research and successful experiences across Europe. Elements of 
these recommendations can be considered at all levels of government, from the local to 
European level. 
Youth unemployment is complicated, and the first step for policymakers is to better understand 
the phenomenon and then assess their particular situation and formulate an appropriate 
strategy. One important unifying principle is that policymakers must take stock of the ‘world of 
work’ and ‘world of education’, carefully and critically consider how they interact and make 
informed decisions about how the two might better complement one another. A flexible, 
informed and nuanced approach represents the best chance to improve labour market 
outcomes for young people.    
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Introduction  
Youth unemployment in the European Union far exceeds general levels of unemployment. At 
its worst in February 2013, youth unemployment stood at 23.5% in the euro area versus 12% 
overall unemployment (Eurostat, 2013). As of February 2017, these same figures stood at 
19.4% and 9.5%, respectively. These indicators are dramatically more troubling in certain 
countries, notably Greece and Spain, which respectively showed rates of 47.3% and 44.4% 
youth unemployment for 2016 – the highest in the EU. While the proportion of unemployed 
youth versus the overall unemployed population has not changed dramatically (remaining 
roughly two-to-one) even during the Great Recession,1 it has become increasingly clear that 
youth unemployment carries significant risks beyond the short-term opportunity costs of an 
individual simply out of work. Lawmakers and academics have dedicated considerable funds 
and attention to the youth labour market, which raises the question of whether existing 
approaches are fruitful and these funds are being well-spent.  
Figure 1. Unemployment rate in the EU28, 2007-2017 
 
Source: Own representation, data from Eurostat (seasonally unadjusted unemployment rates). 
                                                     
1 Youth unemployment rates change by around 1.79% for every percent change in adult rates, indicating a high 
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Youth unemployment of today is substantively different than before 
The youth unemployment of today is distinguished from that of earlier periods by several 
characteristics, including the growth of long-term unemployment for certain categories of 
youth. This is especially true of those who ‘inherited’ a legacy of unemployment from their 
parents, transmitting and perpetuating disadvantage for certain groups of young people 
(Martin, 2012; O’Reilly et al., 2015). Furthermore, the pervasiveness of labour market flexibility 
has made it difficult for young people to secure stable employment trajectories, leading to 
underemployment, precarious employment and frequent returns to unemployment after 
having held a position. While youth of today are better educated than those of earlier 
generations, their education often poorly aligns with the skills required by employers (see e.g. 
McGuinness et al., 2015; McGuiness and Flek, 2016). This is particularly true of certain fields of 
study, namely the arts and social sciences; graduates of these programmes experience higher 
rates of mismatch and over-education. Simply stated, the global economy has evolved quickly, 
and in many cases educational curricula have been slow to adapt to changing demands for 
entry-level qualifications in the labour market. The European Union itself has changed and 
expanded too, with more extensive and diversified migration patterns offering both challenges 
and opportunities in the youth labour market. These factors, combined with a sluggish recovery 
from the Great Recession, have left a troubling number of European youth unemployed and 
disenfranchised.    
Youth unemployment today has sparked discussion of a “lost generation” 
The phenomenon of youth unemployment is composed of many parts, some of which are more 
worrying than others. A young person not employed but participating in tertiary or vocational 
education, for example, is a far cry from one not in employment, education, or training (NEET) 
– a member of what some authors have called “the lost generation” (Morsey, 2012; O’Reilly et 
al., 2015). Clearly a young person in education is making an investment in his or her future, 
whereas the outright costs of young NEETs in 26 member states are estimated at around €153 
billion, or 1.2% of the EU’s GDP (Eurofound, 2012a). Beyond strictly economic considerations, 
many researchers have emphasised the individual and societal consequences of this ‘lost’ or 
‘scarred’ generation.2 Young people, unable to find work commensurate with their skills and 
education, have had to resort to remaining at or returning to their parents’ homes, working 
informally below their skill levels, accepting lower lifetime earning trajectories and facing 
marginalisation both within and without the labour market. Individuals facing unemployment 
early in life are more likely to experience recurring unemployment later in life, and the effects 
of such marginalization transcend the individual. Numerous authors have emphasised the 
intergenerational disadvantages diffused from unemployed parents of “work-poor 
households” to their children (see e.g. Berloffa et al., 2015; 2017). Anti-social behaviour and 
unrest are additional considerations associated with youth unemployment, with the potential 
to create social exclusion and all manner of socioeconomic harms. Youth unemployment has 
                                                     
2 See, for example, Sum et al. (2000) and O’Higgins (2004). These authors suggest that people with difficulty 
integrating into the labour market early on suffer from lifelong scarring effects that diminish their resilience and 
ability to succeed in their careers. 
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also been associated with depression, lower life expectancy and higher risks of health 
complications (Hammarström, 1994; Hammarström and Janlert, 2002; Bell and Blanchflower, 
2009). One young Italian interviewee explained how they perceive their current situation and 
how it affects their aspirations: 
I’d like to know that in five year times I’d be able to do something, but I don’t know, 
I’ve stopped desiring things. I mean, I’ve stopped desiring to have my own place, 
not because I wouldn’t like to have a place on my own, but simply because it isn’t a 
desire that I can afford. I can’t desire to go to New York for a month and a half this 
summer to improve my skills and see what is going on there. I can’t afford it and it 
will not happen, not this year, neither in two years’ time. You make do with what 
you have, you do not settle with what you have because you are happy about your 
life but because you scale down your expectations and desires … but while scaling 
down your expectations is something that happens when you become an adult, 
scaling down your desires is a bit sad. I don’t desire anymore to live on my own, to 
have a holiday or to have a baby… I mean, these are things that are not there for 
me. 
Arrigoni et al. (2016, Interview 11, p. 17). 
A note on perceptions of the attitudes of the current generation of young people 
Chapter 1. While the above interviewee suggests that there are important generational 
differences in aspirational attitudes, public debates and political discourses often reveal the 
belief that young people have dismissive attitudes regarding work itself. STYLE findings confirm 
that this is simply not the case (Hajdu and Sik, 2015; Hart et al., 2015). Young people, as much 
as ever, desire decent work and full participation in the social sphere. An analysis of pooled 
data from the World Values Survey/European Values Study (WVS/EVS), the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) and the European Social Survey (ESS) between 1980 and 2010 
revealed no significant differences between birth cohorts regarding the centrality of work, 
employment commitment, or extrinsic or intrinsic work values in evaluating a job (Hart et al., 
2016). While ageing itself has an effect on attitudes towards the work, this literature review 
found no evidence that different birth cohorts view work differently as they age. EU and 
national policies, therefore, should not fail as a result of generation specific cultural deviations.  
Youth unemployment is solvable  
Youth unemployment is worth solving, and experience shows that action begets results. It is 
completely reasonable to expect that smart policy strategies can substantially reduce youth 
unemployment. Consider one of the most successful and ambitious youth employment 
initiatives: The New Deal for Young People in the UK. In the first year of the programme, which 
launched in April 1998, youth unemployment fell by nearly 40% (Anderton and Riley, 1999). 
Between April 1998 and November 1999, 179,000 long-term unemployed young people in the 
UK found employment through the New Deal (Eurofound, 2000). Over the same time period, 
seasonally adjusted youth unemployment dropped three times faster than that for adults 25-
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74.3 A strong economy and overall falling employment doubtless helped reach these 
milestones, but the success of the UK’s aggressive strategy should not be written off to mere 
macroeconomic fluctuations. The New Deal offered up to four months of personalised help to 
unemployed youth to assist them in finding a job, and failing this, a number of options for 
further education, training or subsidised employment became available. The combination of 
personalised support and good macroeconomic conditions is responsible for the New Deal’s 
success. Luxembourg, Norway and Iceland also managed to decrease youth employment 
relative to adult employment over the period 2004-2012 (Hadjivassiliou et al., 2015). 
Luxembourg, for example, saw the ratio of unemployment for 15-19 year olds versus the adult 
unemployment rate fall from 7.43 to 5.53 over these eight years, which include the worst 
period of the Great Recession. When intelligently crafted and well-funded initiatives come 
together with luck, youth employment can grow accordingly.  
The purpose of this policy synthesis 
Out of the dozens of research works composing the STYLE project, this policy synthesis aims to 
filter and summarise the most important findings, but with an emphasis on the practical policy 
recommendations suggested by STYLE partners.4 Although the STYLE project contains a wealth 
of detailed member state-level analysis and recommendations, this paper aims to make 
generally applicable policy suggestions based on research findings and best practices, as well 
as to explain the reasoning underlying the policies – that is, exactly why certain initiatives can 
be expected to yield positive results regardless of the national context. While focused on 
findings from the STYLE project, this paper will also utilise evidence from the broader literature 
to fill gaps where appropriate. This will serve to better contextualise findings and paint a more 
holistic picture of youth unemployment in Europe. While this paper is targeted at providing 
guidance for policymakers, it may also prove useful to academics interested in novel findings 
and ongoing debates pertaining to the youth labour market.  
The organisation of this policy synthesis 
To these ends, the paper is organised as follows: Chapter 1 discusses the definition of youth 
unemployment and related terms of importance to the STYLE project, with a view to achieving 
a uniform understanding before delving more deeply into substantive issues. Chapter 2 
addresses the underlying causes of youth unemployment, with a particular emphasis on factors 
that tend to place youth at a disadvantage in labour markets compared to the general 
population. It then details evidence pertaining to the short- and long-term consequences of 
youth unemployment, focusing on the individual level but also containing a brief discussion of 
societal harms. Chapter 3 synthesises best practices, incorporating findings to recommend a 
13-point plan of action to combat youth unemployment.  
  
                                                     
3 Own elaboration using Eurostat data. 
4 For those unfamiliar with STYLE, a summary is included in the Appendix. 
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Chapter 1. The complexity of measuring and defining youth unemployment 
While measuring youth unemployment may appear simple, it is actually quite complex. The 
most frequently used headline numbers are often misleading. In order to be able to solve the 
problem, policymakers must first be able to properly understand its size and shape. That is the 
objective of this chapter.  
1.1  How young are youth? 
Youth in and of itself is somewhat of an indeterminate range. Most indicators suggest that 
“youth” refers to people between the ages of 15 and 24, as held by ILO and UN statistics. 
However, the fact that individuals are staying in education for longer and beginning their 
independent adult lives later (Eamets et al., 2015) casts doubt on the continued relevance of 
this age bracket. STYLE authors most frequently categorise individuals up to age 29 as “youth”, 
and a few STYLE papers even extend this range until 34 for the purpose of studying various 
school to work (STW) trajectories. These outliers aside, this paper will use the term “youth” to 
refer to individuals aged 15-29, as suggested by Leschke and Finn (2016). This age range 
captures the majority of young people who are transitioning to an independent lifestyle. 
Additionally, it allows for three convenient brackets for ages 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29 to 
distinguish issues facing youth at the early, middle and late stages in their shift to adulthood. 
As numerous STYLE papers show, youth is a highly heterogeneous concept, and indicators such 
as NEET (discussed below) vary greatly between these age groups.  
1.2 Statistics of youth labour market participation 
The ILO and Eurostat use the same understanding of employment, namely that a person’s 
labour force status falls into one of three categories: employed, unemployed or economically 
inactive (Eurostat, 2012). Employed persons are those aged 15 years or more who fall into one 
of two categories: 1) persons who during the reference week worked for at least one hour for 
pay or profit or family gain and 2) persons who were not at work during the reference week 
but had a job or business from which they were temporarily absent (Eurostat, 2017b). 
Unemployed persons include those aged 15-74 years old who: 1) are not employed according 
to the definition above, 2) are currently available for work and 3) are actively seeking work. 
Economically inactive individuals include “pre-school children, school children, students, 
pensioners and housewives or –men, for example, provided that they are not working at all and 
not available or looking for work either; some of these may be of working-age” (Ibid.). 
Figure 2 visualises the proportion of youth in these three categories in the EU for the year 2012. 
While these categorisations may appear straight-forward enough, they are often the subject of 
misunderstandings. Youth in particular fit into overlapping categories with respect to this 
typology. A student, of course, can simultaneously be employed part-time or even full-time. 
Likewise, students (economically inactive) may be seeking work (unemployed), and a young 
person who has no job but ceases looking for one is no longer unemployed. This overlap 
tempers the descriptive power of statistics that measure youth unemployment and causes 
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much confusion. In any case, two primary measures, being youth unemployment rate and the 
youth unemployment ratio, frequently appear in political discussions and research. 
Figure 2. Population employed, unemployed and economically inactive, EU-28, aged 15-24, 
2012 
 
Source: Eurostat definition of youth unemployment and youth unemployment indicators. 
Youth unemployment rate versus youth unemployment ratio 
The unemployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed divided by the total labour 
force (unemployed plus employed). Using the values in Figure 2 as a reference, this would be 
5.6 million divided by 24.4 million, giving a youth unemployment rate of 23% for 2012. This 
rather large figure needs to be understood contextually because compared with the adult 
population, youth are much more likely to be economically inactive, largely as a result of 
education and training. Some 43% of youth aged 15-24 participate in the labour force, versus 
85% of people aged 25-54 (Eurostat, 2017a). Because of the overlap between youth in 
education and also employed or unemployed, this results in a relatively high unemployment 
rate that does not well reflect the reality – namely, that most youth are simply not participants 
in the labour force. A 25% youth unemployment rate, therefore, would not mean that one out 
of every four young persons is unemployed. As a result, Eurostat publishes a second indicator 
of youth unemployment that is less affected by the lower number of youth participating in the 
labour force: the youth unemployment ratio. The youth unemployment ratio is defined as the 
number of unemployed youth divided by the total youth population. Using the numbers in 
Figure 2, the youth unemployment ratio would be around 9.8%. There is some divergence in 
how telling these measures can be. For example, Slovakia had a high youth unemployment rate 
of 34% in 2012, but a fairly average youth unemployment ratio of 10.4%. Similarly, Spain has a 
lower youth unemployment rate than Greece, but a significantly higher youth unemployment 
ratio – 20.6% versus 16.1% (Ibid.). Overall, the youth unemployment ratio better reflects the 
proportion of youth who are unemployed, but the youth unemployment rate is the more 
common measure. Each indicator has its advantages, however, and researchers frequently rely 
on both (O’Reilly et al., 2015; O’Reilly et al., 2017; O’Reilly et al., forthcoming). 
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Early school leaving 
The European Union defines early school leavers5 (ESLs) as, “people aged 18-24 who have only 
lower secondary education or less and are no longer in education or training” (Eurofound, 
2012a). Early school leavers, then, have only achieved pre-primary, primary, lower secondary 
or a short upper secondary education of less than two years (European Commission, 2011). ESL 
includes young people who have dropped out of school before the end of compulsory 
education, those who have completed compulsory schooling but have not gained an upper 
secondary qualification, and those who have followed pre-vocational or vocational courses 
which did not lead to a qualification equivalent to upper secondary level. The definition of ESL 
excludes those who initially drop out of school, but return to finish upper secondary education 
before the age of 25 (Ibid.). Eurostat reports that in 2015, 58.2% of ESLs in the EU were either 
unemployed or inactive (Eurostat, 2017b), although it is worth noting that ESL status can 
change quickly when one enters and leaves educational programmes, employment, and so on. 
Preventing ESL as well bringing ESL youth back into education or training programmes is an 
important EU priority and one that STYLE examined. 
Not in education, employment, or training 
A significant priority area for the STYLE project concerns young people not in education, 
employment, or training (NEET). NEET is a useful way to delineate between youth who are not 
employed because of ongoing education or training, versus youth who are inactive for other 
reasons such as an inability to find work. Unlike unemployed, who are a part of the labour force 
because they are seeking work, NEET can also include those who are unemployed and have 
dropped out of the job search. The term NEET was first used in the UK in 1999 (Mascherini, 
forthcoming; Attewell and Newman, 2010), and while the EU still uses the term, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) began using NLFET (neither in the labour force nor in 
education or training) since a 2013 report on Global Employment Trends for Youth. The 
distinction is that NLFET excludes unemployed youth who are defined as a part of the labour 
force. Because NEETs are neither unemployed nor are receiving further education or training 
to improve their chances of success in the labour market, they constitute a particularly worrying 
segment of the youth population and have become a focal point of interest at the EU and 
member state policy levels (Eurofound, 2013). One criticism of NEET rates is that they are 
affected by institutional regulation, as they relate to the population rather than the labour force 
denominators. NEET is likely to be upwardly biased in countries with vocational education and 
training programmes primarily delivered by firms. Likewise, some countries mandate 
engagement in certain basic learning activities to qualify for unemployment benefits or to take 
part in ‘youth guarantee’ schemes. Such young people, although in a precarious labour market 
situation and at risk of social exclusion, would not be classified as NEETs (Hadjivassiliou et al., 
2015). 
                                                     
5 Eurostat has begun using the term “early leaver from education and training”, but ESL is the term most 
frequently used in STYLE papers and also in most of the surveyed literature. See 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- 
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NEET size and composition 
In 2008, before the global economic crisis was in full swing, the NEET rate for 18-24 year olds 
stood at 14% in the EU. The rate peaked at 17.2% in 2012, and in 2015 the figure dropped to 
15.8%. One important finding has been that NEET status is largely an ‘older’ youth 
phenomenon, centred in the age group from 25-29 (Eamets et al., 2015). NEET rates were fairly 
stable from 2007-2013 for the age group 15-19, but nearly all European countries saw an 
increase in NEET rates for age cohorts 20-24 and 25-29. This is sensible given the higher 
likelihood of younger individuals to be in education or training, whereas older youth are more 
likely to have completed their education, but remain unable to find suitable (or any) 
employment. The proportion of NEETs by country and age group is shown in Figure 3 below. 
Italy shows the highest proportion of NEETs, while Germany and Denmark show the lowest.  
Figure 3. NEETs by age group for EU28 and selected member states, May 2017 
  
Source: Own representation based on data from Eurostat. 
Youth labour market outsiderness and the standard employment relationship 
Youth labour market outsiderness (YLMO) is a term that captures how young people not only 
have difficulties in finding a job, but are also more likely to be employed in precarious jobs. It 
goes beyond a sole focus on the unemployment dimension to understand the situation of youth 
in Europe. Arrigoni et al. (2016) use a “standard employment relationship”, being a full-time, 
permanent and financially secure position, as a reference point for YLMO. Exclusion from 
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cycle of social exclusion.6 Figure 4 below represents dimensions of YLMO in a schematic 
representation. A few key STYLE findings pertaining to YLMO are that institutions for education, 
training and welfare have a significant impact on YLMO (Hart et al., 2015). YLMO was not found 
to greatly affect social and formal political participation compared to young people in general.  
Figure 4. Schematic representation of dimensions constituting labour market outsiderness 
 
Source: Arrigoni et al. (2016: p. 8). 
Precarious employment 
One dimension of YLMO is that of precarious employment, which, as seen in Figure 4, would 
be those types of employment that are either unstable (seasonal, fixed-term, other atypical), 
or permanent and full-time but low paying. As with YLMO, the idea of precarious 
unemployment is understood in reference to a standard employment relationship. The term, 
therefore, is quite flexible across national boundaries. It appears more or less frequently in 
national dialogues based on the strength of the concept of standard employment models and 
other factors (Düll, 2003). One of the main ideas explored in the surveyed literature is the 
extent to which flexible labour markets lead to low employment quality and high levels of 
precariousness (e.g. Hart et al., 2016; Smith and Villa, 2016; Filandri et al., forthcoming; Berloffa 
et al., forthcoming a). 
Youth underemployment 
Underemployment or involuntary part-time employment is an additional category of YLMO, 
referring to people working part-time who wish to work additional hours and are available to 
do so. Underemployed individuals do not work full-time and lack a sufficient volume of work to 
fulfil their desires or needs. As in the discussion of precarious employment, the idea of youth 
underemployment often falls into the discussion of ‘flexicurity’: the idea that labour market 
flexibility trades off with employment security. Figure 5 below compares youth 
underemployment with a few other discussed indicators across the five largest EU economies 
to demonstrate the heterogeneity of the issue. Note that the NEET rate for ages 15-24 is fairly 
static across countries with the exception of Italy, which has the third-highest rate in the EU 
behind Bulgaria and Romania. We also observe the effects of flexible labour contracts; the UK 
                                                     
6 See, for example, Gallie et al., 2003; Jahoda et al., 1972. 
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shows the highest youth underemployment rate (5.9%). Further discussion of how these 
indicators relate to youth unemployment follow in chapter 2. 
Figure 5. Comparing indicators for ages 15-24 in selected EU member states, 2016 
 
Source: Own representation based on data from Eurostat. 
The main takeaway from this discussion is that the youth labour market is heterogeneous and 
often misunderstood. The most-used indicator, the youth unemployment rate, is often 
portrayed in a misleading manner. Furthermore, younger and older youth have different 
vulnerabilities that require individual consideration. Lastly, the large number of young people 
in precarious employment indicates that finding a job is only part of the equation. Short and 
insecure stints in employment are hardly a desirable solution to youth unemployment. Having 
addressed the complexity of measuring youth unemployment, this paper will proceed to 
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Chapter 2. Causes and consequences of youth unemployment 
2.1 Causes  
Most discussions of the causes of youth unemployment focus on one of two main questions: 
What factors are related to youth unemployment itself? What factors are related to youth 
unemployment being higher than adult unemployment? This chapter concentrates on the 
second question, as the first is better answered by broader studies of labour market and 
economic trends. Moreover, the literature already contains a wealth of evidence on the 
relationship between skills and employment outcomes for young people (e.g. Berlingieri et al., 
2014; MacGuinness et al., forthcoming). Therefore, this discussion of causes focuses on newer 
STYLE research on the relationship between individual socioeconomic factors, labour market 
conditions and youth unemployment. 
Intersecting socioeconomic barriers 
A World Bank report argues that location and mobility represent significant barriers for many 
unemployed youth (Betcherman et al., 2007). This would have greater implications for young 
people living in, for example, less-affluent suburbs. With less-developed professional and 
personal networks, as well as fewer financial resources, youth are less prepared to overcome 
practical hurdles to employment. Additionally, demographic factors including gender, age, 
foreign nationality, ethnicity and education levels have been demonstrated to prolong or derail 
the school-to-work (STW) trajectory (Hadjivassiliou et al., 2016; Akgüç and Beblavý, 
forthcoming). For example, foreign-born youth in Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg have 24%, 
15% and 10% lower probabilities of making a successful school-to-work transition, respectively. 
Gender plays a strong role in labour market outcomes for youth as well; all else being equal, 
men in Slovenia and the UK were 9% more likely than women to make a successful school-to-
work transition in 2008 (Ibid.). Socioeconomic barriers pair with young age, and together this 
creates intersecting disadvantages that reduce the chances of young people successfully 
finishing education or training, as well as securing employment.  
School-to-work transitions are strongly related to whether a youth’s household is work rich or 
work poor 
Two key concepts in the debate are STW transitions and that of work-rich and work-poor 
households. Berloffa et al. (2015b; forthcoming b) devised the following six-part typology 
(indicated in italics) of STW transitions shown in Box 1. 
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STW transitions are found to be strongly correlated with the household work-intensity (HSI) 
indicator insofar as youth from work-rich households enjoy better labour market outcomes 
(Ibid.). Work-rich households are defined by a high (0.5-1) HSI, whereas work-poor households 
are defined by a low (0-0.5) HSI. HSI is the ratio of the total number of months that all working-
age household members have worked during the previous year and the total number of months 
the same household members theoretically could have worked (Eurostat). As Figure 6 shows, 
the relationship between STW trajectories and work richness of a household is stark. For 
example, youth from households with the highest HSI have more than a 20% greater chance of 
a speedy school-to-work trajectory. 
Figure 6. School-to-work trajectory types by household work-intensity indicator 
 
Source: Berloffa et al. (2016). 
Box 1. School-to-work typology 
a) Successful trajectories: 
 Speedy pathway: Those who entered a relevant employment spell within six months 
after leaving education 
 Long search pathway: Those went through a period of unemployment or inactivity of 
at least six months before entering a relevant employment spell 
 In & out successful pathway: Those who entered a relevant employment spell after a 
sequence of unemployment and non-relevant employment spells 
b) Unsuccessful trajectories: 
 In & out unsuccessful pathway: Those who entered only non-relevant employment 
spells 
 Continuous unemployment/inactivity pathway: Those who stayed continuously in 
unemployment or inactivity, without spending even a month in employment 
c) Return to education pathway: Those who go back to education for at least six months, after 
having been in the labour market or in inactivity for more than six months 
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STW transitions and the experience trap 
Young people transitioning from education to the labour market often fail to find a suitable and 
stable job, resulting in an unemployment gap immediately upon leaving school or university. 
For those who do not find suitable employment immediately, frequent job changes and 
repeated unemployment spells typically follow. Berloffa et al. (2016) calculate that roughly half 
of young people who enter the labour market experience a “speedy trajectory”, entering a 
relevant employment spell within six months after leaving education. During the crisis, a mere 
46% of young people had a speedy trajectory. Academics often attribute the inability of youth 
to find a job to educational mismatch, a lack of work experience and the absence of firm-
specific skills (Flek and Mysíková, 2016; Flek et al., forthcoming). The lack of work experience 
may be especially pernicious for youth by placing young workers in the ‘experience trap’, in 
which employers select workers with experience with the result that labour market entrants 
cannot be hired and cannot increase their own experience (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011). The 
experience trap is related to firms’ risk aversion, and it affects youth seeking low-skilled and 
high-skilled positions alike. Additional reasons why younger people perform poorly in the job 
search include younger workers having fewer personal and professional contacts and less 
experience finding work, placing them at a relative disadvantage compared to adults.  
Young people are cheaper to lay off 
Even assuming that a young person’s education, skills and other characteristics match the 
employer’s requirements, youth are still more subject to layoffs. Three examples – fixed-term 
labour contracts, the application of last-in first-out (LIFO) rules and the use of seniority-
weighted redundancy payments - help to explain this discrepancy (Flek and Mysíková, 2016). 
Fixed-term labour contracts, which are discussed in more detail below, allow firms to de facto 
lay off workers by simply allowing a contract to expire, as opposed to renewing or extending a 
contract. Youth are disproportionally represented in fixed-term contracts, resulting in more 
youths experiencing bouts of unemployment in between contracts. Next, the application of 
LIFO rules are an administratively easy way for firms to downsize their employee pool while 
handling budget cuts, but these rules result in younger workers losing their jobs first regardless 
of any consideration of performance. Even in the absence of a formal LIFO policy, firms may 
take the view that the long-term benefits of employing young workers are outweighed by its 
current costs (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011). Lastly, seniority-weighted redundancy payments 
provide an incentive for firms to lay off younger workers first in order to minimise 
compensation paid to laid-off workers. These factors taken together suggest why young people 
are the first to lose their jobs independently of their individual merit. 
Youth accumulate negative results of flexicurity more than other age groups 
Flexicurity, or the balance of flexibility and security in the labour market, is a contentious topic. 
While the term has faced much criticism and fallen out of favour in recent years, it is important 
for understanding the plight of young people in European labour markets (Eamets et al., 2015). 
Box 2 below explains the meaning of flexibility. 




Flexibility and youth outcomes 
EU policymakers largely focused on external numerical flexibility in the period 2000-2010, 
corresponding with the strong emphasis on numerical flexibility during the second half of the 
Lisbon Strategy (Leschke and Finn, 2016; forthcoming). Over the same period, the number of 
temporary and fixed-term contracts increased sharply. External numerical flexibility 
disproportionately affects youth for of a variety of reasons, but a large part of the equation is 
that young people simply have less bargaining power than adults due to their comparatively 
little work experience and other factors explained above – meaning youth are less able to 
successfully negotiate standard employment contracts. The lack of work experience 
additionally means that they are less able to benefit from functional flexibility, and they 
experience fewer opportunities from internal flexibility because they lack seniority relative to 
older workers (Eamets et al., 2015). As a result, young people are at greater risk of working 
under non-standard contracts, lose their jobs more quickly than the comparable adult 
population, have less job and income security due to their lower seniority and limited 
employment histories, and enjoy less access to unemployment benefits than workers on 
standard employment contracts (Eamets et al., 2015). Figure 7 shows the development in 
unemployment and non-standard employment over the economic crisis period for three age 
groups, demonstrating that youth have been more prone to unemployment and holding 
temporary contracts throughout the economic crisis.  
Box 2. Atkinson’s definition of flexibility 
Atkinson’s (1984) definition of flexibility is the most widely used, differentiating four parts as 
follows: 
 External numerical flexibility: Adjustment of the number of workers hired from the 
external market, achieved by employing workers on temporary work or fixed-term 
contracts, or through relaxed hiring and firing regulations 
 Internal numerical flexibility: Adjustment of working hours or schedules of workers 
already employed 
 Functional flexibility: Extent to which employees can be transferred to different tasks 
within a firm 
 Financial or wage flexibility: Ability to differentiate the wages of workers 
BLAME IT ON MY YOUTH! POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RE-EVALUATING AND REDUCING YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT | 15 
 
Figure 7. Developments in unemployment and non-standard employment over the crisis period 
Source: Leschke and Finn (2016, 10). 
 
Income security is less effectual for youth 
Young workers experience both explicit disadvantages in terms of rules of access to 
unemployment benefits and implicit disadvantages in access through their over-representation 
in temporary contracts and shorter average tenure (Leschke and Finn, 2016). For example, 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia restrict unemployment benefits for certain types of 
temporary workers. In the UK, youth under 18 are not entitled to any form of unemployment 
benefit insurance regardless of what type of contract they held before. In Italy and Ireland, 
younger workers’ benefit rates are lower than those for older workers. Austria, Bulgaria, 
Germany and the Netherlands make unemployment benefits duration commensurate with 
contribution payments, which disproportionally affects younger workers with shorter 
employment tenure. The stimulus period (2008-2009) saw a number of efforts to relax 
restrictions on criteria for unemployment benefits, but the following austerity period largely 
did away with that trend. This picture is, however, highly simplified. The reality is much more 
heterogeneous, taking for example Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, which relaxed eligibility 
criteria for unemployment benefits during the ‘austerity’ period of 2010-2014. Nevertheless, 
with only three exceptions (Romania, Lithuania and Estonia), youth in the EU27 are less likely 
to receive unemployment benefits than adults (Leschke and Finn, 2016). A further nuance to 
this argument is the finding that a lack of income security, particularly when combined with 
inadequate familial resources, often leads young people to accept any job (Filandri et al., 
2016b). This tendency could indicate that a lack of income security has ambivalent effects on 
unemployment rates while exacerbating the issue of mismatch. 
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2.2 Consequences of youth unemployment 
The costs of youth unemployment are high by any measure. Morsy (2012) notes that a lack of 
employment opportunities may trigger violence, juvenile delinquency and social unrest. The 
increase in youth unemployment during the Great Recession exacerbated income inequality 
throughout Europe, particularly in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The opportunity 
cost to member states is enormous in terms of revenues not received. Macro-level findings 
such as these have been instrumental in motivating policymakers to address youth 
unemployment. Research from e.g. Hart et al. (2015), Berloffa et al. (2015a; 2016; forthcoming 
a) and Filandri et al. (2016a; 2016b; forthcoming) has further contributed to our understanding 
of youth unemployment by investigating a different variety of its consequences, namely the 
attitudinal and cyclical effects of youth unemployment. Chapter 2.2 proceeds with a discussion 
of consequences, addressing both the social and individual level.  
High costs to society  
It is difficult to put an accurate cost on youth unemployment, but a number of studies have 
attempted to do so, variously incorporating the cost of unemployment benefits, jail time for 
unemployed offenders who otherwise would not have offended, lost opportunity costs, etc. 
The Prince’s Trust (2010), in a report prepared in partnership with the London School of 
Economics and the Royal Bank of Scotland, estimated the annual cost per young jobseeker in 
the UK to be between £5,400 and £16,000. The report puts the cost of 744,000 unemployed 
youth in the UK at £155,000,000 per week in benefits and lost productivity. Eurofound 
calculates the “cost of not integrating NEETs” in Europe at over €150 billion, or 1.2% of GDP in 
2011 figures. Certain countries including Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia 
and Poland are paying more than 2% of their GDP in costs related to NEETs (Eurofound, 2012a). 
Public health considerations 
Various studies have found that unemployed individuals experience greater health risks 
including lower life expectancy, high chances of heart attack and suicide. Hammarström (1994) 
notes the relationship between unemployment and higher incidence of illness and domestic 
violence, particularly battering of wives and children. Young unemployed women are more 
likely to experience physiological illness, while young unemployed men are more prone to 
increased alcohol consumption. Unemployment for both sexes is associated with greater 
tobacco and illicit drug usage (Hammarström, 1994). The effects also seem to be modulated by 
age, as a study of Pennsylvania workers who lost their jobs in the 1970s and 1980s found that 
the effects on life expectancy were sharper for younger than older workers (Sullivan and 
Wachter, 2009).  
High costs for individuals 
Additionally, research strongly suggests that unemployment begets more unemployment and 
lower wages – and that this effect can be permanent. The Prince’s Trust (2010) found that that 
every three months of unemployment at age 22 is associated with an additional 1.3 months of 
unemployment between ages 28 and 33. With respect to earnings, those who are unemployed 
for 26 months before age 22 earn $1,400 to $1,650 less than their peers at age 26 and $1,050 
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to $1,150 less at age 30. This ‘wage scar’ 
has been found in other studies too. 
One finds that if a young person spends 
a year unemployed before the age of 
23, they will earn 23% or 16% lower wages ten years later for men and women, respectively 
(Gregg and Tominey, 2005). By the age of 42, men and women would earn 15% and 12% less, 
respectively. Some research has found that the permanence of wage scarring is unique to low-
skilled workers, whereas for medium- and high-skilled workers the effect is temporary (Burgess 
et al., 2003). 
Psychological well-being and insecure lifestyles 
Arrigoni et al. (2016) conducted a series of interviews that seem to point to a few conclusions: 
YLMOs and young unemployed individuals consistently lower their expectations in life, and 
cope with financial insecurity through whatever means are available to them. This includes 
working multiple odd jobs, living with family or friends and spending long periods of time living 
off the bare minimum amount of money possible. One interviewee with a psychology degree 
and pedagogical certification as a high school teacher described a job cleaning the doorways of 
buildings: “I was working from 9 am until 2 pm and I was receiving €350 with a contract formally 
employing me for three hours per day” (Arrigoni et al., 2016, p.16). The same individual worked 
other jobs including washing dishes in various restaurants, reading gas meters, data entry and 
“doing other weird stuff” (Ibid.). The interviewee qualified for unemployment benefits for four 
months, and after losing access to these benefits, resorted to living in different squatted houses 
and stealing. While an extreme example, this serves to show how young people, even those 
who are highly educated and qualified, must accept the most menial and insecure employment. 
This case also demonstrates the constant jumps between various housing and employment 
situations, and the accompanying sense of insecurity. The rapid changes in employment and 
housing status are also confirmed by Flek and Mysíková (2016). One interviewee summed up 
the situation as follows: 
Well, [the main challenge for my generation] is the absolute precarity. Everything is 
very difficult and precarious. Everybody is working in shitty jobs to get some money 
and – in this city – things are tough... [It is difficult] to avoid all this precarity – which 
is always there – brings you down, leading you to think only about yourself and 
forget about others.  
Interview No. 57, Arrigoni et al. (2016) 
Cyclical unemployment begets cyclical poverty 
Berloffa et al. (2015a; 2016), Gökşen et al. (2015a) and Filandri et al. (2016a; 2016b) examined 
the extent to which unemployed youth may have become so as a result of household factors 
such as growing up in a work-poor environment. Berloffa et al. (2015a) conclude “decisively” 
that in every surveyed European country, young people who grow up in a work-poor or 
workless household are significantly more likely to be unemployed. In the UK for the year 2011, 
for example, 42% of young people from work-poor households were unemployed, versus 16% 
One year of unemployment before age 23 leads 
British men to earn 23% less ten years later. 
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for young people from work-rich households. These findings indicate that unemployment, and 
the poverty that accompanies it, is very likely to have intergenerational effects. Failing to deal 
with youth unemployment now is likely to have long-term repercussions. 
Young people return home and delay adulthood – the so-called ‘full-nest’ syndrome 
Leaving the home is frequently considered to be the first step in an independent adult life, and 
doing so requires some degree of financial security. Over time, and increasingly after the Great 
Recession, young people are staying home longer and returning to live at home more often. 
This is particularly true in northern and continental European countries (Gökşen et al., 2015b). 
While other factors including welfare regimes, parental income and a young person’s marriage 
status all influence how long one stays at home and whether one returns, employment status 
is consistently found to have a robust effect on whether a young person lives with his parents 
(Gökşen et al., 2015b; Mazzotta and Parisi, forthcoming; Medgyesi and Nagy, forthcoming). 
Job mismatch and human capital development 
Research has found that youth are especially prone to mismatch, which is consistent with 
broader evidence in the literature (e.g. Cedefop, 2010; McGuinness et al., 2015b; forthcoming). 
This is sensible for a variety of reasons, but one important factor is attitudinal: the desperation 
that young people feel to find any source of employment. The effect of mismatch, like 
unemployment, appears to be cyclical in that mismatched workers are more likely to move 
from one mismatch to another (Wooden et al., 2007). McGuinness et al. (2015a) and Flek and 
Mysíková (2016) suggest that young people are less likely to have their qualifications fully 
recognised in the labour market, which may result in both unemployment and job mismatch. 
In both cases, youth face a diminished prospect for human capital development. McGuinness 
et al. (2015b) additionally find that higher unemployment rates are related to a growth in youth 
over-education. Unemployment, then, leads to both more unemployment, lower paying jobs 
and jobs that poorly match young workers’ qualifications. 
The trap of taking any job instead of a sensible job 
Youth who have experienced unemployment, particularly those from lower-income families, 
are more likely to settle in their job search. By contrast, youth coming from a higher income 
household have greater flexibility to be patient, only accepting positions that enable a solid 
career trajectory (even if lower paid or unpaid – an ‘investment’ position), as opposed to 
accepting any paid position (Filandri et al., forthcoming; Berloffa et al., 2016). One might 
consider a recent graduate who must work full-time as a server to support himself, versus one 
able to pursue an unpaid internship related to their studies, or perhaps spend longer 
unemployed while searching for ‘dream’ entry-level positions, due to financial support from 
their families. This is one sense in which youth unemployment contributes to income inequality 
and serves to further entrench poverty. 
2.3 Summary of the causes and consequences of youth unemployment 
Some reasons for higher youth unemployment are inherent to youthfulness and therefore 
rather static. Figure 6 on STW transitions shows that only a fraction of young people manage 
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to secure employment immediately upon leaving school or graduating. This is for a variety of 
factors, such as younger people having fewer networking contacts, less experience job hunting, 
and less work experience to leverage. Other explanations may include firm-level decision-
making; firms tend to be risk averse and prefer to hire individuals with proven experience in 
the labour market. Poor hiring choices can be very expensive for employers, and hiring 
someone with no or minimal experience may not be an effective strategy. Still deeper 
explanations must include macroeconomic conditions including flexibility which affects young 
people’s prospects in the labour market. As in the general population, the reasons for a young 
person being unable or unwilling to find employment are diverse. Nevertheless, the findings of 
the general literature and STYLE research could be said to summarise the causes of youth 
unemployment as follows: factors that have always given young people a disadvantage on the 
labour market combined with various labour reforms implemented since the beginning of the 
21st century to make youth uniquely vulnerable to unemployment (Grotti et al., forthcoming). 
This Great Recession was a catalysis of this vulnerability, resulting in persistent and excessive 
youth unemployment in Europe. (Hadjivassiliou et al., forthcoming).  
As for the consequences, young unemployed people report a diverse range of experiences, and 
this chapter can hardly give voice to all of them. Perhaps the most universal transformation is 
that young people experiencing unemployment are forced to lower their expectations for their 
work and their lives. High-achieving university graduates may find themselves cleaning 
bathrooms and waiting tables for an indefinite period, conscious that this diversion from their 
preferred career track is both necessary and damaging for their chances to be taken seriously 
by potential future employers. Other individuals reluctantly dropped out of school and were 
surprised to find themselves competing with graduates for the same unskilled positions. 
Unemployment (as well as precarious employment) can have profound effects, and STYLE has 
helped explore some of these with a number of methodologies. Two of the most important 
findings have been the additional nuance revealed about the cyclical nature of unemployment, 
and the impacts of unemployment on human capital development.  
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Chapter 3. What can be done about youth unemployment? 
From the broad survey of EU youth unemployment issues covered in the STYLE working papers 
and beyond, this policy synthesis derives a number of best practices and policy suggestions. 
These points are meant to be generally applicable, rather than pertaining to a specific country 
or political system. As detailed previously, youth unemployment is strongly linked to general 
unemployment. Nevertheless, because youth are disproportionately vulnerable to certain 
elements of the labour market, policies targeting youth unemployment specifically are likely to 
be fruitful in minimising barriers and maximising labour market opportunities for young people. 
3.1 Always keep in mind the need for a supportive macroeconomic environment 
All surveyed evidence (e.g. Hadjivassiliou et al., 2015; forthcoming; Eichhorst and Wozny, 2016) 
indicates that improving the labour market for youth is predicated on improving the labour 
market generally. Even the best targeted policies for youth unemployment cannot succeed in 
the face of shrinking or stagnant economies. Youth unemployment is strongly correlated with 
overall unemployment across all countries, in spite of the fact that the ratio of youth to overall 
unemployment shows variation. Achieving a stronger economy, with conditions conducive to 
employment growth, is the single most important factor for improving the labour market 
outcomes of young people. 
3.2 Ensure high-quality education for all levels, particularly early childhood and 
primary: focus on prevention, early identification and support for youth in 
vulnerable households 
Education is the bedrock upon which young people make the transition to the labour market. 
While upper secondary education receives a great deal of attention (Berlingieri et al., 2014) 
because it often occurs adjacent to STW transitions, policymakers should not to neglect 
appropriate investments in education at all levels. The surveyed literature suggests that 
education can help minimise the effect of socioeconomic inequalities, providing skills and 
competencies necessary to mitigate the intergenerational transmission of disadvantages. 
Unsuccessful STW transitions and ESL have a number of early warning signs that can be acted 
upon by educators. Foreign-born, low-income and other disadvantaged students can be 
targeted with additional support measures to increase the chances that they successfully 
complete education with the skills to succeed in higher education, vocational training or the 
labour market directly. Filandri et al. (2016a; 2016b) underline that certain issues, including 
household makeup, familial participation in the workforce and the extent to which youth 
contribute to household income (Medgyesi and Nagy, forthcoming) and other microeconomic 
factors, play a large role in determining one’s ability to engage in schooling and the labour force. 
3.3 Increase opportunities for low- and middle-class children, and for households with 
a weak attachment to employment, to pursue higher education 
Identifying and offering support to students in secondary and even primary education may be 
an effective measure to prevent early school leaving, which is strongly correlated with lower 
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attainment and higher probability of unemployment and NEET. Vulnerable students might be 
identified by indicators such as material deprivation, which helps distinguish between 
situations where low income does not result in situations of vulnerability (Gökşen et al., 2015a). 
Work-poor households, as shown in Figure 6, also play a strong role in predicting labour market 
outcomes for youth. Moreover, gender and migrant status continue to act as strong predictors 
for sub-optimal outcomes such as ESL and unemployment. By identifying and offering 
counselling and other support to vulnerable students, support that may be lacking from 
traditional household sources, it may be possible to keep more students in school for a longer 
period of time, providing youth with the education and skills needed to find gainful 
employment.  
3.4 Prevent dualistic labour market structure: welcome incoming ‘outsiders’ 
One of the key messages of the surveyed research (e.g. Russell et al., 2015; Smith and Villa, 
2016) is to be wary of increasing the flexibility of markets without paying adequate attention 
to the security of vulnerable workers. Economies are too heterogeneous to offer concrete and 
generally applicable policy prescriptions (Eamets et al., 2015), but it is clear that flexibility often 
begets duality. What this means is that as European markets became more flexible, the labour 
force has sometimes split into standard employment contracts largely held by adults, and 
precarious contracts largely held by young people and other outsiders. This is both a 
normatively and economically undesirable outcome. Facilitating young people’s transitions 
from irregular to regular employment needs to be a policy focus. 
3.5 Promote a more holistic and accurate understanding of youth unemployment 
Youth unemployment per se is not the problem, nor should it be the metric by which labour 
market policies are evaluated. The problem is labour market outcomes for young people. At 
the most simplistic level, the youth unemployment ratio ought to become a standard indicator 
instead of the youth employment rate because the former accounts for the reality that most 
young people are not actively engaged in the labour market. At a deeper level, more use of 
broader indicators such as youth labour market outsiderness (YLMO) can facilitate a better 
understanding of the number of young people for whom the educational system and labour 
market are not working. In addition to changing the emphasis on which indicators matter to 
evaluate youth labour market performance, the definition of youth must change. Youth can 
hardly be said to end at age 25 for the majority of Europeans. Acknowledging that youth lasts 
longer than it used to is an important first step. Moreover, evaluating the individual issues that 
people face at ages 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29 enables a more holistic assessment of issues facing 
those transitioning into the labour force, while allowing researchers to better appreciate the 
nuances between young people of different backgrounds and educational outcomes (Leschke 
and Finn, 2016).  
More targeted data on the youth labour market will also benefit future research. Consider, for 
example, that STYLE authors were confronted with a lack of data on active labour market 
policies (ALMPs) targeted at youth. This absence of data made it difficult to conduct an accurate 
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cost-benefit analysis of ALMPs, which could be very helpful in formulating informed policy 
recommendations. Therefore, policymakers and academics alike should emphasise the value 
of carrying out youth-specific labour market research and achieving some level of uniformity in 
the definitions used to facilitate better and more widely applicable research. Youth 
unemployment is a much more complicated phenomenon than implied by the youth 
unemployment rate alone, and understanding this fact is a prerequisite to fostering informed 
policymaking in this area. 
3.6 Encourage youth employment policy innovation and experimentation, as well as 
knowledge-sharing mechanisms 
No single policy prescription represents a panacea for youth unemployment owing to the 
inherent complexity of the issue as well as the variability between member states in terms of 
governments and economies. Policy experimentation and innovation, therefore, will play a 
leading role in finding appropriate and effective policies that maximise labour market 
opportunities for young people, and STYLE afforded considerable attention to studying policy 
environments that allow innovation to stagnate or to thrive. Petmesidou and Gonzalez-
Menendez (2016: p. 12) define effective innovation as:  
… Policy changes in objectives, programmes and delivery processes that are 
conducive to positive results with regard to the labour market and social inclusion 
of youth (and particularly of the most disadvantaged/disaffected young people). […] 
Our emphasis is on social innovation, namely the development of “new ideas, 
services and models to better address social issues. 
 
Limit procedural barriers to policy experimentation and innovations 
In some cases, the key to fostering innovative policies may be removing procedural barriers. 
Excessive bureaucratisation in Greece, for example, has been found to hinder policy innovation 
and knowledge diffusion. Highly centralised administration structures, such as those in Greece 
and Turkey, are further barriers insofar as localities have less leeway to experiment with new 
policies. The opposite can also be true, however. In the case of France, Petmesidou and 
Gonzalez-Menendez (2015) identify a fragmentation of the system, without a clear overarching 
Box 3. Any type of government can innovate or stagnate 
One of the findings of Petmesidou and Gonzalez-Menendez (2016) is that governance structure 
does not explain the differences in policy experimentation and innovation or path dependency 
and inertia. Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands, for example, have highly variable 
administrative systems from the regional/local level to the central government. Nevertheless, 
these three member states are the most favourably disposed towards policy experimentation 
and innovation. This is an indication that policy experimentation and learning for youth 
unemployment ought to be possible regardless of the type of government in power – whether 
highly centralised or devolved – and regardless of the educational or vocational structures in 
place. 
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coordinating structure, as a barrier to effective innovation. Attitudes among various French 
stakeholders also impact innovation, as they display a lower receptivity to innovation and “a 
certain resistance to change” (Ibid., p. 19). To some extent Spain has benefited from devolution, 
allowing greater local and regional experimentation as well as high levels of coordination at the 
local and regional levels. Reducing other administrative barriers, such as administrative 
ritualism and competition between levels of governance, would further benefit Spain’s 
innovation outlook.  
Systematically perform programme evaluation and impact assessment at all levels of 
governance 
The three nations identified as highly innovative and having a low rate of youth unemployment 
– Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands – share a few commonalities in spite of their vastly 
different governance and educational systems. Each conducts robust programme evaluation at 
every stage of policy implementation. The UK in particular has a strong tradition of evidence-
based policymaking, while Denmark implements evidence-based adjustments using a common 
knowledge repertoire that systematically feeds into policy innovation. While the Netherlands 
has no tradition of post-evaluation research change or controlled policy experiments, it still 
benefits from extensive dialogue in the social domain that seeks to build consensus around 
policies beneficial to all parties: in effect, creating an inclusive forum to discuss the efficacy of 
policies. The Netherlands in particular also benefits from robust regional experimentation, 
exemplified by the successful experience of The Pact for a Youth Unemployment-Free Zone in 
Mid-Brabant (Petmesidou and González-Menéndez, 2016). 
Enhance policy learning and transfer channels 
Petmesidou and Gonzalez-Menendez (2016: p.4) argue that the key factor driving successful 
innovations is “systematic interaction and feedback among all levels of governance from the 
bottom upwards and the reverse, which is conducive to negotiated and evidence-informed 
innovation”. Such feedback allows incremental adjustments and fine-tuning of policies, 
changes in policy instruments, soft forms of learning, and ultimately the diffusion of successful 
new policies. One successful method for knowledge transfer is found in the Netherlands, which 
benefits from a ‘knowledge triangle’ or ‘triple helix’, meaning collaboration at the local level 
between the public sphere, knowledge institutions, and the market. Furthermore, at the 
national level, Dutch stakeholders conclude social covenants, social accords and multilateral 
agreements to change policies and find agreement on reforms and practices better suited to 
current issues. Denmark relies on a corporatist learning framework with diffusion channels 
between all levels of governance and stakeholders’ bodies. Other countries rely more on soft 
forms of learning from other countries or international bodies such as the OECD, as well as 
expert networks and mutual learning programmes. Clearly a variety of policy learning and 
transfer channels exists within the EU, and no single system is best. The challenge for 
policymakers, therefore, is to develop and implement robust knowledge transfer channels that 
work within a given member state’s context. Petmesidou et al. (2016) contend that this is a key 
policy dimension enabling diffusion and implementation of strategies to effectively counter 
youth unemployment.  
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3.7 Strengthen the role of the education system in STW transitions 
It is clear that higher education institutions can play a leading role in preparing youth for the 
labour market, and facilitating the STW transition has already been recognised as a key policy 
area for addressing youth unemployment (Eurofound, 2012a). McGuinness et al. (2015b) make 
two suggestions that can reduce the probably of mismatch and perhaps also unemployment. 
Encourage degree programmes to provide more practical experiences 
First, degree programmes should focus on providing students with more practical experiences. 
This applies to vocational education, as McGuinness et al. (2015b) observe a strong inverse 
relationship between the aggregate number of vocational course components in a degree 
programme and the probability of mismatch in a graduate’s first job. The value of practical 
educational tools, however, equally applies to non-vocational programmes such as liberal arts 
university curricula. Findings indicate that irrespective of the field of study, increasing the 
practical aspects of degree programmes will reduce the incidence of initial mismatch. Such 
practical aspects might include project-based learning, which was found to lower the 
probability of severe mismatch for graduates. By comparison, a focus on written assignments 
had a positive correlation with over-education and severe mismatch. Findings by McGuinness 
et al. (2015b) suggest that the acquisition of facts and practical knowledge, as well as project- 
and problem-based learning are the most effective route to link students with satisfactory jobs. 
Increase resources for higher education job placement 
Second, policymakers should increase resources allocated to higher education job placement 
assistance. McGuinness et al. (2015b) looked at a number of routes for labour market entrants 
to come to their first position, finding that jobs found through family or friends, as well as 
private employment agencies, tend to produce the most severe mismatch. By contrast, higher 
education work placement and “help from higher education”7 produce the lowest levels of 
mismatch and severe mismatch, only exceeded by those who find employment “through 
previous work”. With these findings, policymakers should encourage educational institutions 
to implement or expand work placements with the potential to develop into permanent posts. 
A robust ‘career centre’ or similar service can act as a critical link between the education system 
and labour market. 
3.8 Focus resources on certain ALMPs more relevant to youth 
ALMPs represent a diverse group of policy tools with the potential to improve the prospects of 
young people in the labour market. Gonzalez Carreras et al. (2015) discuss the following types 
of ALMPs: (1) employment incentive programmes, (2) rehabilitation, (3) job creation schemes, 
(4) labour market services, (5) labour market training and (6) business start-up assistance. 
While ALMPs have a role to play in combatting youth unemployment, not all are created equal 
in terms of the likely costs and benefits. Furthermore, those that are successful in affecting the 
overall population may not be appropriate in targeting youth. For example, long-term 
                                                     
7 “Help from higher education” was one possible survey response youth could indicate as the manner in which 
they came to be matched with their employer. 
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unemployment among adults is often caused by obsolescence of skills, such that further 
training provides a useful tool for improving labour market outcomes for this group. Young 
people’s difficulties are likely better supported by (1) extending programmes offering work 
experience (job creation and employment incentives) and (2) policies aimed at increasing the 
percentage of youth in vocational education. In addition, broader programmes offering close 
monitoring, counselling and retraining, such as the UK’s New Deal for Young People, and 
Belgium’s 2004 Cooperation Agreement8, may also be appropriate – particularly in conditions 
of sufficient labour demand. 
Use employment incentive programmes 
Gonzalez Carreras et al. (2015) estimate that an increase in participation in employment 
incentive programmes (relative to youth unemployment) by one percentage point reduces 
youth unemployment by 0.7 percentage points. In comparison, labour market service and 
business start-ups do not show a significant effect in any estimated models, nor does increasing 
the participation in labour market training. While the authors urge caution in interpreting these 
results, due to data availability and other methodological issues, they also make a strong case 
for a causal relationship between youth employment incentives and youth employment. Youth 
employment incentives can take either the carrot or the stick approach. In recent years, 
Belgium has seen success utilising both. The Belgian federal government offers employers 
€1,000-1,100 for a period of 12 months if they hire a person younger than 26 with a maximum 
of secondary education (Petmesidou and González-Menéndez, 2015). Meanwhile Belgium has 
introduced sanctions for firms not employing particular proportions of young people (Eichhorst 
et al., 2016). Anecdotally this strategy has been working, as Belgium’s standing in terms of 
youth unemployment, relative to other member states, has improved significantly since 2004. 
Similar patterns have been observed in Poland and Romania. 
Consider job creation programmes  
Meanwhile, Gonzalez Carreras et al. (2015) find that a 1% increase in participation in job 
creation schemes (stocks as a percentage of youth unemployment) would decrease the youth 
unemployment ratio by 0.4%. This finding is counterintuitive to much of the evidence on the 
effectiveness of ALMPs such as Card et al. (2010) or Martin (2015), but other research most 
often concerns the general population. The finding that job creation schemes reduce youth 
unemployment reflects the fact that effective policy should enable young people to gain 
experience in the workplace, which is consistent with other literature (e.g. Dorsett and Luccino, 
2013; Kalwij, 2004), suggesting that improving the labour market experience for young people 
reduces an individual’s risk of unemployment. 
Increase the number of youth in vocational education 
Gonzalez Carreras et al. (2015) calculate that increasing the stocks of youth (aged 15-24 years) 
in vocational education by one percentage point would reduce the youth unemployment ratio 
                                                     
8 The 2004 Cooperation Agreement marked a shift towards implementing activation policies focused on the 
supply side of youth labour. These efforts were intensified with the Jeugdwerkplan [Youth Employment Plan] in 
Flanders. For more information on the 2004 Cooperation Agreement, see Lievens and Vandenbroucke (2015). 
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by 0.25 percentage points. It would, however, be a large-scale intervention as there are already 
many young people in vocational education, and vocational programmes have comparatively 
high costs per participant while eventually running the risk of diminishing returns. This finding 
is consistent with other literature (e.g. Berlingieri et al., 2014) and EU policy initiatives that 
promote vocational education as a crucial tool to facilitate young people’s transition into the 
labour market and teach them skills relevant to labour demand. 
3.9 Expand the use of labour intermediaries to facilitate mobility 
Findings indicate that public or private labour market intermediaries can play a positive role in 
stemming youth unemployment in Europe. While labour market intermediaries are often 
viewed critically,9 Hyggen et al. (2016) find that these institutions can facilitate movement and 
greater labour market opportunities for young people. Indeed, the precedent has already been 
set at the European level with the initiative Youth on the Move, which aims to promote mobility 
in order to foster youth employment, to leverage skills and experiences of young workers and 
to improve the matching quality of labour supply with labour demands (European Commission, 
2010). While Youth on the Move makes use of various instruments, Hyggen et al. (2016) argues 
that governments should give greater consideration to labour market intermediaries to 
promote mobility and reduce unemployment. The potential of labour market intermediaries is 
especially marked in countries and industries facing labour shortages. Examples of industries 
with high labour demand that may benefit from labour intermediaries include tourism, 
care/health and high-tech (Hyggen et al., 2016). 
 
With monitoring and sensible regulations for private labour market intermediaries, and 
expanded use of public intermediaries, such institutions can positively contribute to the 
European youth labour market. Young people looking for work are often more willing to move 
abroad due to fewer ties and obligations such as children and long-term housing arrangements. 
                                                     
9 See the Appendix for a brief summary of criticism of labour market intermediaries. 
Box 4. What are labour market intermediaries? 
Labour market intermediaries may be private companies, public employment services or 
educational institutions. Job seekers face a variety of obstacles such as information deficits, 
insufficient social networks, financial burdens and lax foreign language skills. Intermediaries 
can help to reduce these barriers with services such as playing the ‘matchmaker’, pairing 
employers with suitable candidates, facilitating training, providing housing and completing 
administrative work for employers and young migrants. Labour market intermediaries 
effectively make the two-way relationship between employees and employers into a triangular 
relationship. Besides the obvious benefit to employers, wherein they receive an employee, 
Hyggen et al. (2016) point to a variety of evidence showing that migrants using intermediaries 
profit too. For example, migrants recruited by intermediaries obtain better-paid working 
contracts compared to migrants relying on informal networks. 
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Nevertheless they face numerous barriers including more limited work experience, financial 
resources and work-related networks. Beyond matching job searchers and employers, 
intermediaries can secure good working conditions for youth by counselling and controlling the 
employer (Hyggen et al., 2016). Public labour market intermediaries might act as important 
anti-discriminatory and integration tools for young people (Kureková and Ortlieb, 2016), which 
is particularly important for youth from newer member states and third countries. Improved 
youth labour mobility can have significant positive externalities as well. Work experience 
abroad has even been shown to reduce gender inequalities, as indicated by a reduced income 
disparity for young returning Estonian workers (Hyggen et al., 2016). Local public employment 
services or educational institutions should bolster their roles as information providers for young 
people hoping to work abroad. Greater international collaboration between public 
employment services, such as using the network of EURES, is an important step forward. 
3.10 Enhance integration and non-discriminatory treatment of migrants 
Young people are more mobile than the general population, and as such youth are 
disproportionately affected by migration policies. Research has found that migration in the EU 
is driven by labour shortages and national programmes to bring in additional labourers (Akgüç 
and Beblavý, 2015). Additionally, the fall of the Iron Curtain, the accession of new member 
states and the economic crisis have altered migration dynamics. Modern South Europeans and 
East Europeans have diversified their destinations compared to previous generations, moving 
beyond neighbouring countries as was the tendency in the past. East Europeans of all skill levels 
have shown an increased likelihood of emigration (Akgüç and Beblavý, 2015). The increasing 
mobility of Europeans represents both a challenge and an opportunity for all member states. 
Facilitating a positive experience for young migrants is an essential aspect of not only the labour 
market, but also preventing outsiderness and anti-social behaviour. Accordingly, researchers 
have made a number of findings pertaining to the youth experience in labour mobility and 
corresponding policy suggestions.  
Implement better screening and transparent evaluation schemes for skill evaluation of 
migrants 
Migrants are more likely to be both over- and under-skilled, and this results in a great deal of 
occupation and education mismatch with a variety of negative externalities. Smoothing 
international skill transferability and offering on-the-job training possibilities to young migrants 
would help avoid skill mismatch. Increased efforts to facilitate recognition of foreign 
qualification and experience might include continued efforts to standardise educational criteria 
and develop a European dictionary of education and grades, building on the Bologna Process. 
In this vein, the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) and the European Credit System for 
Vocational Education and Training (ECVET) are two tools designed to enhance the mobility of 
learners and the portability of qualifications (European Commission, 2017: ECVET, 2017). 
Continuing their implementation is likely to improve the outlook for young labour migrants.  
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Implement tools matching migrants to jobs 
Successful job matching is an important step in minimising the damage caused by mismatch. 
Tools such as EURES (the EU’s Job Mobility Portal), public or private employment agencies or 
well-designed job portals can be useful to decrease information asymmetries in intra-EU labour 
mobility. As discussed above, labour market intermediaries can be a powerful tool for matching 
job seekers to suitable employers, particularly at a cross-national level. This is equally true for 
positions of all skill levels, as demonstrated by the positive experience of youth working with 
labour intermediaries operating in Austria and Slovakia, as well as in Norway and Sweden 
(Hyggen et al., 2016). 
Increase support for language training programmes 
Improving language skills is an important step to empower young migrant workers, as 
insufficient language skills often force migrants to take up jobs below their skill level. Research 
confirms that language proficiency remains a key barrier preventing otherwise-qualified young 
people from taking up well-suited positions abroad. One option to address this issue would be 
an increased focus on intra-EU exchange during primary or secondary education, which would 
likely entail more classroom time for foreign languages or a greater variety of available foreign 
language classes. Subsidised language courses or increased financial support opportunities for 
youth participating in language training are additional methods to facilitate language skills 
development (Hyggen et al., 2016; Mýtna Kureková and Ortlieb, 2016). 
3.11 Use hybrid support methods to empower youth entrepreneurs 
This policy synthesis has not addressed entrepreneurship up to this point, but it still merits 
discussing as entrepreneurship is widely recognised as a key engine for economic growth. 
Although self-employed entrepreneurs do not constitute a large portion of the economy (and 
even less of the youth population), young people are an important demographic for policies 
promoting start-ups. Evidence shows that younger people are more likely to be innovative in 
their business models and more ambitious in terms of job creation (Masso et al., 2015). 
Accordingly, a number of existing EU and national policies promote self-employment and 
entrepreneurship, particularly for target demographics such as youth, women and ethnic 
minorities. Such programmes aim to overcome barriers facing youth in self-employment and 
business creation, such as a lack of start-up capital, procedural hurdles and limited business 
connections or social networks. Nevertheless, efforts to date have been lacking in a few 
important dimensions. 
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Sheehan and McNamara (2015) note that both EU-wide and member state-specific initiatives 
for entrepreneurship can utilise both ‘hard’ support (financial support) and ‘soft’ support 
(coaching, counselling, and networking). Hard support aims to overcome financial barriers for 
entrepreneurship that disproportionately affect youth, women and ethnic minorities. Soft 
support aims to motivate and advise aspiring entrepreneurs, or in the case of some 
programmes targeting primary and secondary school students, to develop entrepreneurial 
mind-sets and skills. The European Commission and OECD (2014) have increasingly recognised 
that hybrid support is the most effective method for promoting entrepreneurship. 
Recommendations include the provision of unemployment benefits for a certain time period, 
particularly at the start-up stage, targeting the needs of specific groups of unemployed, 
involving local partners, and aligning support schemes with tax and social security schemes. In 
spite of the growing consensus that hybrid support is most effective, only 15% of the 
programmes surveyed in six EU countries provide both hard and soft support (Sheehan and 
McNamara, 2015). Supporting entrepreneurial efforts leads to innovation, economic growth 
and job creation, and should therefore be a priority area for policy makers. 
Minimise job creation challenges and avoid deadweight 
While business start-up assistance and similar policies show great potential, other evidence 
suggests that some caution is in order. For starters, there is always a risk of ‘deadweight’ policy 
interventions. McNamara et al. (2016) found that 49% of young people who received start-up 
assistance said they would have been “very likely” to set up the business anyway absent the 
assistance. Some 50% who received assistance additionally said that they would have set up 
the business when they did and not later if they had not received assistance. While one may 
argue that assistance in these cases was deadweight, it is conceivable that start-up assistance 
helped firms to survive, if not outright enabled their creation. Still, even the more sceptical 
Box 5. Do not confuse self-employment and entrepreneurship 
There is a need to differentiate between opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, as opposed to 
necessity-driven self-employment. In the absence of a standard definition of self-employment 
at the European level, member states have developed their own interpretations of the term as 
well as distinctions between self-employment and entrepreneurship. Most importantly, self-
employed work, in and of itself, may not be desirable. It is a heterogeneous category that does 
not necessarily imply self-determination, independence or the potential to expand business 
and hiring opportunities. In comparison with dependent employees, self-employed individuals 
general work longer hours, have lower median earnings and lack social security-safety net 
protection (Sheehan and McNamara, 2015). Self-employed individuals are often ‘pushed’ into 
self-employment or freelance work because of minimal opportunities in the formal labour 
market. This is opposed to the idea being ‘pulled’ into entrepreneurship, intending to “generate 
value, through the creation or expansion of economic activity, by identifying and exploiting new 
products, processes or markets”, and potentially creating positions for additional employees. 
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findings of McNamara et al. (2016) conclude that the hybrid approach including both hard and 
soft assistance is a promising policy option. Taken together, research suggests that the 
emphasis should be placed on minimising the job creation challenges perceived by young 
entrepreneurs, including financial costs, appropriate skills and experience, and legal obligations 
(Sheehan et al., 2016). 
3.12 Offer a lifeline for NEETs and ESLs 
While policymakers must concern themselves with the efficiency dimension (To what extent 
does a particular policy reduce youth unemployment?), they must also take account of the 
equity dimension. In this sense it is critical to target NEETs and facilitate their further education 
or employment, as innovative policies in France and the UK have been shown to accomplish 
(Petmesidou et al., 2016). As discussed, NEETs are a heterogeneous group and one-size-fits-all 
policies are unlikely to be effective. Accordingly, a large degree of policy innovation will be 
necessary to find and implement suitable solutions for member states. The following example 
is not meant to be taken as a prescription for policymakers, but rather to offer readers a better 
understanding of a few programmes, implemented at different levels, that have served to 
empower NEETs around Europe. 
Consider specialised programmes – an example from the UK 
One UK school programme called “Numeracy and Literacy Lessons Leading to ISCED 3 Level”, 
or “Bridging Course”, demonstrates a highly successful and innovative approach to unemployed 
or at-risk youth. By the end of the course, students are expected to reach a standard level of 
English and math proficiency, which is a prerequisite for most further education, vocational 
training programmes and even entry-level jobs. The course is intended to provide this 
groundwork for a positive transition for young people, whose education has somehow been 
derailed, into tertiary education, vocational education or straight into employment. Beyond 
English and math, the Bridging Course places emphasis on soft skills such as communication, 
socialisation, CV writing and punctuality. According to the Curriculum Manager:  
The focus is very much on employability. Academic qualifications are really geared 
towards turning these youngsters into employable young citizens… There is a social 
side to it; it will often be communication skills, socialisation, confidence building, 
motivation, all these kind of things that employers need to see. We also make sure 
that we are very much looking after the whole student and the whole learner. What 
we say is, I’m not interested in producing a robot who can reel off mathematical 
facts but doesn’t know how to hold a conversation, who struggles in interviews. 
Lőrinc et al. (2016: p. 6) 
Something akin to this Bridging Course is an important fall-back to have for students who, for 
whatever reason, have not completed their schooling and find themselves stuck. The Bridging 
Course is a school of last resort for some, particularly dropouts and those who have been 
expelled. For others the course fills the skills gap resulting from entering the education system 
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too late. In all cases, the programme offers counselling and personalised support for young 
people in need of a successful experience. The Curriculum Manager said: 
We know where students end up largely because they will keep in touch with us… 
There is no buzz and there is no more rewarding thing than getting some snarling, 
rude, demotivated little so-and-so, knocking them into shape (…) you find out two 
years later down the line, they got their level 3 diploma and are about to join to 
train for social work or even as a teacher. 
Lőrinc et al. (2016: p. 14) 
3.13 Adjust expectations and allow country-specific deviations to the Youth Guarantee 
The Youth Guarantee is a commitment by all member states to provide young people under 
the age of 25 with a quality offer of employment, continued education, apprenticeship or 
traineeship within a period of four months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal 
education (European Commission, n.d.). Part of the underlying logic in the programme’s 
implementation is that after a period of months, an unemployed young person’s chance of 
finding employment drops off, becoming comparable with the long-term unemployed. To date, 
the Youth Guarantee has been the European Commission’s flagship response to youth 
unemployment, but its implementation has been troubled. An audit published in April 2017 
found that in none of the five surveyed member states were all young people given a quality 
offer within four months of unemployment. The auditors’ suggestion is to (1) manage 
expectations by setting realistic and achievable objectives and targets and (2) perform gap 
assessments and market analyses prior to setting up the schemes (European Court of Auditors, 
2017).  
This is in line with other literature as well. Flek and Mysíková (2016) found that dynamics within 
four months of unemployment vary a great deal from country to country, which suggests that 
a more individualised approach is appropriate, as opposed to a single European-wide goal post. 
For example, in 2010-2011, 44% of young Austrian unemployed found a job after four months 
of unemployment. Over the same period, only 29% of French and 21% of Spanish youth 
accomplished the same. Accordingly, Flek and Mysíková (2016) and other researchers 
recommend an adjustment in the Youth Guarantee, whereby countries account for slower 
employment transitions in setting their targets. While the Youth Guarantee is a positive 
development for young people in Europe, it is also necessary to temper expectations and set 
realistic and achievable targets based on empirical evidence.  
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Appendix 
Criticism of labour market intermediaries 
Labour market intermediaries have been criticised on grounds that they contribute to the 
exploitation particularly of vulnerable groups such as young people, women, and individuals of 
certain nationalities. Eurofound (2016), for example, reports that agriculture, construction, 
domestic work and hotels and restaurants are prone to trafficking for labour exploitation. 
Private intermediaries tend to view employers as their main clients rather than the workers, 
which weakens the position of young job seekers relative to employers and employment 
agencies. Furthermore, McGuinness et al. (2015) find that the use of private intermediaries can 
contribute to skills mismatch. The potential for negative outcomes, particularly with private 
labour market intermediaries, is well established and not to be understated. Even so, Hyggen 
et al. (2016) find that mainly private companies are involved in transnational job search 
processes, and public intermediaries play only a minor role. Additional research has found that 
working via temporary labour agencies has profound and negative effects on individuals. Silla 
et al. (2005) find that temporary workers experience poor health outcomes. This notion is 
disputed, however, with authors such as Bardasi and Francesconi (2004), who find no evidence 
that atypical employment is related to negative health consequences. 
  
42 | KILHOFFER, BEBLAVÝ & LENAERTS 
 
About the STYLE Project 
The EU and its member states have identified youth unemployment as a critical research area, 
and the Strategic Transitions for Youth Labour in Europe (STYLE) project is a reflection of the 
EU and member states’ ongoing efforts to better understand the causes and solutions to youth 
unemployment. STYLE is a research project exploring obstacles and opportunities affecting 
youth unemployment in Europe. Twenty-five research partners, an international advisory 
network and local advisory board of employers, unions, policy makers, and NGOs from over 20 
European countries are involved in the project. STYLE aims to achieve 10 objectives organised 
around 12 research, dissemination, and management work packages (WPs). The objectives are 
as follows: 
i. Create a critical mass of resources in collaboration with stakeholder communities (WP2) 
ii. Provide a critical evaluation of the performance of countries and regions (WP3) 
iii. Assess the prospects for policy transfer mechanisms (including those under the 
European Social Fund) (WP4) 
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v. Examine the consequences of mismatch in terms of labour mobility and migration for 
young people within the EU (WP6) 
vi. Analyse the nature, rate and success of business start-ups and self-employment for 
young people (WP7) 
vii. Examine the cultural context of family organisation and the pathways to enhancing 
independence (WP8 ) 
viii. Map the voices of vulnerable young people by identifying their different values and 
aspirations (WP9) 
ix. Analyse the nature and mechanisms of flexicurity regimes and how they contribute to 
overcoming youth unemployment (WP10) 
x. Advance the knowledge base by publishing an ‘International Handbook on Strategic 
Transitions for Youth Labour in Europe’ (WP11) 
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 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding 
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